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A model to decompose the performance of supplementary private health insurance markets.

Int. J. Health Care Finance Econ. 8, 193-208 (2008)
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For an individual insurance firm offering supplementary private health insurance, a model is developed to decompose market performance in terms of insurer profits. For the individual contract, the model specifies the conditions under which adverse selection, cream skimming, and moral hazard occur, shows the impact of information on contracting, and the profit contribution. Contracts are determined by comparing willingness to pay for insurance with the individual's risk position, and information on both sides of the market. Finally, performance is aggregated up to the total market. The model provides a framework to explain the attractiveness of supplementary markets to insurers.
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Publikationstyp Artikel: Journalartikel
Dokumenttyp Wissenschaftlicher Artikel
Schlagwörter Adverse selection; Cream skimming; Moral hazard; Private health; insurance
ISSN (print) / ISBN 1389-6563
e-ISSN 1573-6962
Zeitschrift International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics
Quellenangaben Band: 8, Heft: 3, Seiten: 193-208 Artikelnummer: , Supplement: ,
Verlag Springer
Begutachtungsstatus